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Real Fantasies: Reinserting the Imaginary in the Scene of Social Encounter 
 
 
This article is about a failure to imagine the ‘imaginary’ in sociology, or to think it 
through with enough critical awareness as a form of social interaction. When C. 
Wright Mills (1959/1967) outlined his promise for the ‘sociological imagination’, he 
offered, in effect, not a manifesto for the imagination itself, but for the need to 
imagine the world sociologically. Even though Mills emphasises a capacity to shift 
between macro- and micro-perspectives – from ‘impersonal and remote 
transformations to the most intimate features of the human self’ (p. 7) – the built in 
assumption was that the intimate and individual modes of apprehension were also 
traps, forms of bewilderment, that had to be transcended. What people need (or what 
‘men’ need, as Mills failed to imagine that women could also comprehend their lives) 
‘is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in 
order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may 
be happening within themselves’ (p. 5). They yearn ‘for facts, they search for their 
meanings, they want “a big picture” in which they can believe and within which they 
can come to understand themselves’ (p. 17). To imagine sociology means to situate 
oneself within this bigger factual picture.  
 
A similar index of the way in which the imaginary fails to establish itself as an object 
of social enquiry could be read out of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities 
(1983), where the ‘imagined’ needs so to be insisted on against the grain of historical 
and political scholarship. The nation, he argued, ‘is an imagined political community’; 
it is ‘imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most 
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of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion’ (p. 6). Anderson defends his choice of 
‘imagined’ here against Hugh Seton-Watson, the members of whose community 
merely ‘consider themselves to form a community’ (my emphasis), and Ernst Gellner, 
for whom ‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist’ (p. 6). The fine line the ‘imaginary’ has to 
tread is as something less neutrally reflective, more emotive, than ‘consider’, but not 
thereby a ‘fabrication’ or a ‘falsity’ to be dispensed with. Though nationhood may be 
an intangible entity in some sense, Anderson’s book does furnish it with a material 
basis, as a living ‘image’, around which are organised commitments in the minds of 
specific individuals, which circulate more tangibly in letters, essays, maps, artefacts 
and histories. However, in the example with which Anderson opens, the tombs of 
Unknown Soldiers ‘saturated with ghostly national imaginings’ (p. 10), one sees how 
hard it is to prevent the mental and emotional side of the equation from becoming 
unreal and unknowable, ‘ghostly’. 
 
Anderson’s book came out at a time that saw a widespread attempt to materialise 
imagination as a necessary object of study, particularly in feminist history and cultural 
studies (Burgin, et al. 1986; Walkerdine, 1990; Alexander, 1995; Dawson, 1994). 
Many of these publications shared a sense of the ‘imaginary’ (and ‘fantasy’, with 
which it is often used interchangeably) as a complex chain, or set of mediations, 
which includes ‘inner’ events (daydreams, erotic fantasies, memories, dreams, the 
images and ideals inspired by reading fiction, news or history), and an ‘outer’ field in 
which such representations circulate. Walkerdine (1990), for instance, suggested that 
‘femininity and masculinity are fictions linked to fantasies deeply embedded in the 
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social world which can take on the status of fact when inscribed in the powerful 
practices, like schooling through which we are regulated’ (p. xiii). For Graham 
Dawson (1994) ‘Masculinities are lived out in the flesh, but fashioned in the 
imagination’ (p. 1). Note how both these statements attempt to subvert the distinction 
through which ‘imaginary’ is relegated to the interior, private or unreal side of the 
social equation – fictions and fantasies are ‘embedded in the social world’. Yet at the 
same time such authors emphasise that they are struggling against the grain to make 
present for social reflection something which the latter is always rendering invisible. 
The editors of Formations of Fantasy begin by acknowledging the ‘fundamental 
objection in common sense to considering fantasy in the context of the social and 
political’ (Burgin, et al., 1986, p. 1); Sally Alexander warned historians not to 
‘jettison fantasy’, a loss which ‘has implications beyond the reach of feminist history’ 
(1995, p. 229). Thirty years later, fantasy and the imaginary remain a contentious, 
only sporadically visible object within mainstream social science – something that 
still repeatedly has to be argued for, re-found, re-demonstrated. Social anthropologist 
Henrietta L. Moore recognises that ‘what anthropological theories ignore… is the role 
of fantasy’, and makes the case that the discipline ‘needs to take the imaginary 
seriously if it is to provide an account of the relationship of individuals to cultural 
orders’ (2007, pp. 11, 14); Sasha Roseneil’s work advocates for Avery Gordon’s 
theorisation of ‘socio-cultural ghosts’ which offers a ‘generative way of thinking 
about how the social-historical lives in memories, imaginations and cultural texts… in 
the fleeting, the ephemeral, the almost invisible’ (2009, p. 417); Jacqueline Rose 
(1996) contends ‘there is no way of understanding political identities and desires 
without letting fantasy into the frame’ (p. 4), even though fantasy is commonly 
regarded as ‘supremely asocial’ (p. 2); David Marriott (2018) – who I’ll return to later 
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– argues that in Fanon’s social therapy, ‘it is the reality of the phantasm, or the way 
reality is maintained as a phantasm, that needs to be accounted for’ (p. 51). 
 
The relations between psychoanalysis and sociology remain marked by this double 
rift between the imaginary and the social, whereby the imaginary is branded as both 
fictional and private (or ‘inner’) in such a way as to divorce it logically from the study 
of social life. And to some extent, trends within psychosocial studies in the last 
decade have grown accustomed to working with this rift, either (via Lacan) by 
subordinating the imaginary to the symbolic, and promoting in particular the analysis 
of social discourse over the mental life of individuals;i or (via post-Kleinian 
approaches) which maintain a concept of ‘phantasy’ as something deeply unconscious 
and distinct from the more cognitivist languages of representation common in 
sociology.ii There is a recent growing literature that mobilises Winnicotttian concepts 
to understand the political, though the focus has often been less on dimensions of the 
‘imaginary’ and more on mapping Winnicottian terms directly onto political reality – 
for instance, Honig’s (2017) combination of Winnicott with Arendt to interpret 
‘public things’ as transitional objects; or Swartz’s (2019) conceptualisation of protest 
movements in terms of ‘ruthlessness’.iii  
 
The questions this article will broach have to do, firstly, with how we imagine human 
interaction, and what contributions psychoanalysis can make to sociology in restoring 
emotive imaginary factors to its considerations of interaction processes. 
Psychoanalysis is well placed to contribute here, given its very particular attention, 
over the course of a century, to the observation of people’s fantasies and their 
entanglement with identity formation, moral ideology, cultural production and social 
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enactment. But behind that project lies another question, of how to sustain an 
adequate disciplinary space – or cross-disciplinary space – within which such 
contributions can themselves be successfully imagined (without merely reproducing 
the divide between the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’, the inner and the outer). Such a 
‘psychosocial’ space would include ‘fantasy’, ‘fiction’ and the ‘imaginary’ as a social 
fact, which not only accrues like a penumbra ‘around’, or at a distance from social 
events, or as a ‘distortion’ of social reality, but which is itself part of that reality, 
manifesting at both psychological and broader cultural levels. To maintain this 
perception necessitates ongoing interaction between sociology, cultural and media 
studies, psychology, psychoanalysis and anthropology. Here I’m arguing that the 
‘imaginary’ can itself provide a useful platform on which to build such interactions. 
 
This article can only provide an improvisatory sketch of how such a middle or 
common ground – one based around the imaginary as an object of enquiry – could be 
delineated. It cannot give an adequate account of the many different strands of 
psychoanalytic theorisation operating in sociological and psychosocial literature, and 
will be necessarily schematic in its pursuit of a few general problems in relation to the 
‘imaginary’. But I want to begin by drawing attention to the way in which many 
different psychoanalytic and sociological conceptions of imagination are saturated by 
models couched in terms of dramaturgy – internal or external theatres, scenarios, the 
drama of mental life, the drama of social situations, and so on. The ‘inner’ 
psychological space to which the clinical literature in psychoanalysis most often 
refers – a space of conscious and unconscious memories, fantasies, and emotionally-
charged images of people and events – is often described as a kind of theatre, going 
back to some of Freud’s earliest intimations about psychical life, including his 
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description of dream-life as taking place on a different stage, or ‘scene of action’ 
[Schauplatz] from waking life, or the presentation of Anna O’s ‘private theatre’ in 
Breuer and Freud’s Studies on Hysteria. Sometimes such metaphors indicate a realm 
of illusion, but more often they simply recognise that our minds consciously and 
unconsciously play host to imagined scenarios (in recall, in anticipation, or as 
reverie). 
 
For Paula Heimann (1942) ‘the memory-traces of psychical experience, past and 
present, are… moving and living dramas, like never-ending scenes on a stage’ (p. 11). 
Donald Meltzer (1978) called phantasy ‘a theatre for the generating of meaning’ 
which imbues the external world with ‘emotional significance’ (p. 384). These are 
authors working in a Kleinian tradition, but the traction of dramaturgical metaphors 
goes much wider than this. Joseph Sandler (1962), a contemporary Freudian, 
compared the representational world to a stage set within a theatre: ‘The characters on 
the stage represent the child’s various objects, as well as the child himself...’ (p. 134). 
According to French psychoanalyst Joyce McDougall (1985), everyone ‘harbours in 
our inner universe a number of “characters”, parts of ourselves that frequently operate 
in complete contradiction to one another, causing conflict and mental pain to our 
conscious selves. For we are relatively unacquainted with these hidden players and 
roles’ (p. 4). Moreover, there is a whole sub-domain of psychoanalytic and 
psychotherapeutic theorisation about ‘scripts’. To quote Eric Berne (1975), a script ‘is 
an attempt to repeat in derivative form a whole transference drama, often split up into 
acts, exactly like the theatrical scripts which are intuitive artistic derivatives of these 
personal dramas of childhood’ (p. 116); by ‘fantasies’ Robert Stoller (1985) intended 
‘meanings, scripts, interpretations, myths, memories, beliefs, melodramas, and built 
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like a playwright’s plot, with exquisite care, no matter how casual and spontaneous 
the product appears’ (p. 49). The terms drama or scenario are usefully broad, allowing 
for the fact that people may imagine things in narrative or visual form, or may play 
host to a conversation of voices or characters. The form of the aesthetic metaphors 
may differ, but what is shared is the notion that people continually model scenes, 
gestures, conversations or roles internally. 
 
This is equally true of certain traditions in sociology, particularly those focused on the 
micro-sociology of social engagement. Berne’s description bears a close resemblance 
to Erving Goffman’s view in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) that 
‘ordinary social intercourse is itself put together as a scene is put together... Scripts 
even in the hands of unpractised players can come to life because life itself is a 
dramatically enacted thing’ (p. 72).iv In the Preface he famously stated: ‘The 
perspective employed in this report is that of the theatrical performance; the principles 
derived are dramaturgical ones’ (p. xi), and in the same work he approvingly quotes 
the influential sociologist Robert E. Park: ‘everyone is always and everywhere, more 
or less consciously, playing a role… It is in these roles that we know each other; it is 
in these roles that we know ourselves’ (p. 19). Other versions of this dramaturgical 
discourse (including the widespread reference to actors, scenes, role-taking and 
performance) can be found in work on social ritual and social performance, in Victor 
Turner’s cultural anthropology, in strands of social psychology (Rom Harré described 
expressive action as a resolution of ‘dramatic’ situations), and in Arlie Russell 
Hochschild’s (1983/2003) work on the sociology of emotions – ‘everyday life clearly 
requires us to do deep acting’ (p. 47). Above all it continues as a significant thread 
within the tradition of social interactionism – Susie Scott’s (2015) study of 
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approaches to social identity throughout refers to identity as performative, which she 
distinguishes from Judith Butler’s theorisation because for Scott there is always an 
‘actor’ behind the scenes. Such actors ‘co-operate to stage versions of reality’ (p. 21) 
and ‘performances are tailored to the audience’s expectations and normative codes of 
conduct’ (p. 85). 
 
Such comparisons help to undermine the assumption that psychoanalysis deals only 
with the internal, sociology with the external. In using dramatic metaphors, 
psychoanalysis implicates deeply ‘internal’ aspects of emotional life and the psyche in 
the strategies and rituals of public scenes, and illustrates the traffic between them. 
Correspondingly, it is clear the sociologists who study social interaction and human 
encounter are often forced to flesh out some aspect of what happens ‘internally’, in 
the subjective space of individual minds, because their descriptions involve complex 
articulations of how each protagonist mentally imagines or anticipates an encounter.  
 
What also becomes apparent is the reductively ‘cognitive’ nature of the way such 
internal imagining is often conceived by the sociologists who have tended not to base 
their accounts on observations that reveal the complexity of internal life or 
psychological behaviour (or have drawn from the psychology literature in a very 
selective fashion). Where they do construct mental process, this often serves as a way 
of extending a model of social interaction into notionally personal mental space. What 
gets constructed ‘inside’ typically focuses on rational or conceptual factors, and on 
strategic choice. Identity is ‘actively accomplished worked at and “done” by 
individuals in the course of interaction, and this is a self-conscious, reflexive process’ 
(Scott, 2015, p. 20). If outside we have a specific situational performance, inside is an 
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epitome of this with room for making decisions about how best to play it. What has 
tended to drop out are elements central to psychoanalytic interpretation, including 
unconscious factors, emotions, or specifically psychological dynamics (see Craib, 
1998; and Groarke, 2014, for a critique of the cognitive bias of sociology from a 
psychoanalytically-informed perspective). Though this is not to say that sociological 
interaction is necessarily conceived as a smooth and transparent process. For both 
Meade and Goffman the ability to pressure someone into a response is part of normal 
practice, and Goffman himself washe was fundamentally interested in deception – the 
social agent ‘may wish to ensure sufficient harmony so that the interaction can be 
sustained, or to defraud, get rid of, confuse, mislead, antagonise or insult them’ (1959, 
p. 3).  
 
Where sociology and psychoanalysis depart from each other in their characterisations 
of dramaturgy can best be pin-pointed by turning to a couple of examples of 
sociologists who supply more complex theorisations of internal representational 
processes drawing on Freudian models: Gidden’s (1984) theory of society, which 
includes an account of ‘the psychological foundations of the interweaving of 
conscious and unconscious’ (p. 41), and Hochschild’s (1983/2003) work on emotional 
labour, which asserts that ‘a social theory of emotion must have both a social and a 
psychological side’ (pp. 228-229). Gidden’s Freud is a ‘cognitivist’ Freud, mediated 
by the work of Sullivan, Horney and Erikson, who ‘argued that Freud’s preoccupation 
with repression and the unconscious led him to underplay the more cognitive, rational 
components of the agent’ (1984, p. 52). He finds little use for Freud’s second 
topography of the psyche, divided between id, ego and superego, reframing this with a 
different kind of stratification in terms of ‘basic security system, practical and 
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discursive consciousness’ (p. 41). On the way, accounts of desire, and the passionate 
demands of the id, drop out of the model, which begins to resemble a cybernetic 
system geared towards maintaining stability, and for which the prime affect is anxiety. 
‘Ordinary day-to-day social life… involves an ontological security founded on an 
autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines and encounters’ (p. 64), where 
anxiety signals a disruption in the expected routine. Turning this into a developmental 
account, Giddens argues that anxiety is ‘canalized or controlled’ during the earliest 
experiences of the infant when the ‘basic security system’ is shaped. This formation 
depends substantially upon predictable and caring routines established by parental 
figures; but in development towards adulthood ontological security is increasingly 
‘maintained in a more fundamental way by the very predictability of routine’ itself, 
which is tested and disrupted in ‘critical situations’ (p. 50). The conception of depth-
psychological process developed here is remarkably akin to the ‘surface’ world whose 
routines and patterns of trust it is designed to underpin. What is especially striking 
from a psychoanalytic perspective is the way in which emotional and psychological 
life are almost fully conflated with what Freud termed the ‘reality principle’. It’s as if 
Freud’s two principles of mental functioning – pleasure and reality – had been 
reduced to one.v This remains the case even in later iterations such as Modernity and 
Self-Identity (1991) which emphasises unconscious emotional commitments alongside 
cognitive frames – emotion here still essentially coincides, functionally, with the 
cognitive, supplying a ‘defensive carapace’ necessary to ‘get on with the affairs of 
day-to-day life’ (p. 40). It is never a disrupter or deflector of cognitive frameworks 
themselves; or it is not acknowledged how far the ‘cognitive’ might depart from the 
‘rational’. 
 
11 
 
Hochschild’s (1983/2003) classic study of the management of emotion similarly 
brings together elements of Goffman with Freud. Perhaps even more so than in 
Giddens, Freud’s psychology of the emotions (here coupled with Darwin) is reduced 
to a form of ‘elicitation-expression’ which she terms the ‘organismic model’. 
Sexuality and desire are again displaced by anxiety which ‘signalled the presence of a 
danger from within or outside the individual’, while joy, sadness, jealousy are equally 
senders of signals about our way of apprehending the inner and outer environment 
(pp. 230-31). Hochschild ties this signalling process to cognition, ‘broadly 
interpreted’ (p. 230). Even so, her account of emotion – which deals both with the 
management of love and hate in an ‘intricate private emotional system’ and with those 
same elements taken into the marketplace where they ‘become stretched into standard 
social forms’ (p. 13) – begins by distinguishing ‘surface acting’ from ‘deep acting’ (p. 
35), which she illustrates with examples from Stanislavski. It is in some ways here, in 
her borrowings from method acting, that the psychological model gets more complex: 
‘Not simply the body or immediately accessible feeling, but the entire world of 
fantasy, of subconscious and semi-conscious memory, is conceived as a precious 
resource’ (p. 40). 
 
However, as with Giddens, there is still a doubling of inner and outer worlds. Though 
the book provides a substantial critique of the ‘estrangement’ of emotion in the 
workplace, it at the same time casts more personal self-experience as inherently a 
form of ‘emotion management’, which Hochschild also refers to as ‘cognitive 
emotion work’ and ‘trained imagination’ (p. 257; p. 38). We use deep acting ‘in the 
course of trying to feel what we sense we ought to feel or want to feel’ (p. 41). Thus 
alienation enters experience primarily not through this need to perform controlling 
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operations on emotion, but because of who commands that process: institutional 
mechanisms come to ‘control how we “personally” control feeling’ (p. 229). Rather 
than supplementing social theory with psychological theory, the sociological 
imagination, itself predicated on increased control and rationalisation, has here 
tunnelled its way into ‘depth’ space and produced, methodologically, a kind of 
assumed dissociation between the self and its emotions, in the very act of bringing the 
emotions into sociology.  
 
One key element missing here, in comparison with psychoanalytic models of internal 
dramaturgy, is the idea that emotions (and emotional memory) – Heimann’s ‘moving 
and living dramas’ – might have a dynamic logic of their own, one even capable of 
driving aspects of cognition in ‘non-rational’ ways. In Hochschild the self-reflexive 
operation of the ‘internal’ scene differs little from how the sociologist herself might 
analyse a sociological vignette of a micro-encounter. But the more 
psychoanalytically-informed dramaturgies assume that models of interaction 
accumulate, from childhood onwards, as an imaginative repertoire for a different kind 
of work performed by the emotions themselves, in tandem with unconscious defence 
mechanisms. Disturbing feelings (erotic, aggressive, guilty, envious, hateful) are 
processed into more manageable states, guided by aims such as gratification and the 
avoidance of unpleasure. Thus imagined scenes, from the earliest beating fantasy 
onwards, also function as a way of dealing with internal emotional pressures, ones not 
fully derivative of external interactions, and therefore capable of making an 
independent contribution to them. This allows for the possibility of drama that moves 
in the other direction – projected onto the outside – as in  Meltzer’s formulation, 
quoted earlier, in which internal theatre imbues the external world with emotional 
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significance (1978, p. 384), or McDougall’s observation that ‘psychic plays may be 
performed in the theatre of our own minds or … may take place in the external world, 
sometimes using other people’s minds and bodies, or even social institutions, as their 
stage’ (1985, p. 4).  
 
Such projection might be conceived, weakly, as a kind of individual ‘colouring’ of 
events, laid over the reality of the interaction process (each person may have their 
own differing response to the social ‘reality’); but it can also be theorised more 
strongly as an impulse to constitute the scene of interaction itself in a particular way, 
through selective forms of emphasis, amplification, or disavowal, or by mobilising 
forms of narrative to interpret an encounter, so as to reinforce a fantasized pattern 
(paranoid, idealising, omnipotent, reparative, etc). Dawson (1994) notes how ‘a 
complex process of selection, ordering and highlighting gives prominence to some 
events over others and interprets their significance, thereby making sense of an 
objective world’. In this way events can become bound to fantasies, ‘becoming the 
site of imaginary scenarios with desired and feared outcomes, narrated “as if” they 
had “really” happened in just this way’ (p. 22). In that case, the scenario within which 
Hochschild’s or Scott’s actors bring their strategic gaze to bear may already be 
unconsciously determined by emotional tendencies, and dramatization would provide 
a filter through which the individual experiences reality, rather than a quasi-realistic 
space for rehearsing responses. 
 
What psychoanalysis is adding in to the psychosocial mix, here, is not the 
psychological element per se, but theorisations (underpinned by decades of clinical 
observation) of the way in which specific kinds of emotional and psychical dynamics 
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play out across this imaginal/dramatic field, which don’t just accompany interaction, 
but prove capable of structuring it according to unconscious principles of desire and 
defence (such as projection, negation, identification, repression, and so on). Indeed, 
whatever position the ego adopts in a given situation (critical, accepting, guilty, 
fearful, loving) is potentially already organised as part of such a more extensive, 
complex and partly unconscious drama in which those others encountered may be 
invested with projected aspects of the emotional life of the perceiver. 
 
A further consideration, besides acknowledging the active components of emotion in 
imagination, involves dislodging the ‘fantasied’ place of the ego as internal expert 
(observing and reflecting on scenes) and recognising that this representational space 
may be more seriously moulded by affective and irrational forces than supposed. 
Something a little bit like this was conceded by Hochschild when she acknowledged 
that ‘in the theatre, the illusion that the actor creates is recognised beforehand as an 
illusion by actor and audience alike. But in real life we more often participate in the 
illusion. We take it into ourselves, where it struggles against the sense we ordinarily 
make of things. In life, illusions are subtle, changeable, and hard to define with 
certainty, and they matter far more to our sanity’ (1983, pp. 46-47). This then begs the 
question: why is it assumed that the internal theatre necessarily provides a cognitive 
space for realism, and for rational decisions? The problem is not just that Giddens and 
Hochschild restrict their accounts to the rational forms of cognition which they see as 
most relevant for understanding the processing of social interactions. It is that they 
can’t help but imagine mental space as a space in which we understand things better. 
For Giddens, ‘Understanding is not merely a method of making sense of what others 
do, nor does it require an empathic grasp of their consciousness in some mysterious or 
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obscure fashion. It is the very ontological condition of human life in society as such’ 
(quoted in Craib, 1998, p. 67), an assertion which takes Mills’ bid for a sociology that 
can supply something society currently lacks – ‘lucid summations of what is going 
on’ – and turns it into an always already present condition of social existence.  
 
Something of the affective, passionate, and active investment in inner representation, 
which Giddens marginalises in his account of understanding, is captured in the many 
psychoanalytic notions of ‘fantasy’ which permeate the psychosocial literature, drawn 
from theorists as diverse as Sigmund and Anna Freud, Carl Jung, Melanie Klein, 
Erich Fromm, Susan Isaacs, Jacques Lacan, Frantz Fanon, Wilfred Bion, Corenelius 
Castoriadis, Julia Kristeva, Juliet Mitchell, Slavoj Zizek, Judith Butler and Frank 
Wilderson. These supply a much more complex and differentiated account of all the 
ways in which we might develop scenarios – from unconscious levels of phantasy and 
‘primal scenes’, through dreams, conscious fantasies and daydream, memories and 
fictions, to the internalisation and externalisation of culturally-circulated images, 
narratives, and movie-scenes, which challenges the sense that the imaginary is in any 
way ‘simple’, or singular, or happens just ‘inside’. Fantasy, for writers in this 
psychoanalytically-informed tradition, functions as a composite meta-frame for social 
interaction which crucially cuts across notions of internal and external. And there is 
no dearth of means by which to materialise it.  
 
A good example of the sheer diversity of media through which to actualise a study of 
the ‘imaginary’ is provided by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin White Masks (1952/1986), 
through his investigation of the ‘drama… enacted every day in the colonized 
countries’ (p. 145). Fanon analyses racial representations in several films and popular 
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novels, as well as exploring the psychological and political discourses of race. He 
attends to the imagery of race circulated in children’s picture magazines, schoolbooks 
and comics, and invokes evidence from catch-phrases, counting-songs, 
advertisements and food product labels (p. 116, p. 148, p. 49). He illustrates points 
about unconscious aggression with analyses of dreams drawn from clinical case 
studies (pp. 101-102), while also referencing psychodramas in group therapy (p. 145). 
He records the impact of inserting the word ‘Negro’ during associational tests, and 
cites statistics from a study by Gershon Legman that every American six-year old in 
1938 had assimilated ‘18,000 scenes of ferocious tortures and bloody violence’ (p. 
146); he suggests comparing the difference in identification between black spectators 
watching Tarzan in the Antilles and in Paris (p. 152); he recommends reading ‘the 
compositions written in French by Antillean children between the ages of ten and 
fourteen’ (p. 162); and notes the archetypes emerging from ‘waking-dream therapy’ 
(p. 166). The book is a small laboratory of psychosocial methods designed to illustrate 
(in Fanon’s words) ‘a series of propositions that slowly and subtly – with the help of 
books, newspapers, schools, and their texts, advertisements, films, radio – work their 
way into one’s mind and shape one’s view of the world of the group to which one 
belongs’ (p. 152).  
 
The point I want to make here is that the ‘imaginary’ or ‘fantasy’ elements dealt with 
in the psychosocial literature do not keep being rendered invisible because of their 
extreme distance from social reality (with ‘fantasy’ conceived as a recreational space, 
marginal even to inner life, itself marginal to the practicalities of social action). The 
problem is not that the imaginary is barely present to sociology because it is too 
personal, too psychological, to be a social fact. Rather, it is a reservoir for perceptions 
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structurally excluded from the ‘ontology of understanding’; perceptions and 
experiences which are both part of the ‘bigger picture’ and forced to maintain a 
symptomatic non-life within it. As Fanon himself recognised: the ‘juxtaposition of the 
white and the black races has created a massive psychoexistential complex’ 
(1952/1986, p. 14). In such a racialised field, the white gaze is one that obliterates the 
reality of the black subject, rather than rendering it present – ‘Having adjusted their 
microtomes, they objectively cut away slices of my reality’ (p. 116). 
 
In the final part of the article I want to emphasise the difference between an imagined, 
coherent representational scene, and the more complex agonism actually inherent in 
the model of dramaturgy both sociologists and psychoanalysts invoke, in which what 
is at stake is precisely what will count as real, and what will be evacuated as unreal; 
what will solidify as a social institution, and what will remain barely speakable; what 
will be subjectively owned and what will be projected. The sociological uses of 
‘theatre’ – whether dealing with the inside or the outside – in particular tend to stress 
both the coherence of representations and assume that these integrate (or are ideally 
capable of integrating) with social reality. That is, they assume that ‘social reality’ is 
itself capable of integration. Reality is thus notionally made wholly present, if not to 
the actors themselves, at least to the third party of the sociologist who witnesses or 
interprets the scene, at however macro- or micro- a level. 
 
What frequently gets left out, particularly when sociologists abstract from socio-
historical situations in order to represent the general structure of interaction processes 
in a given society, are those aspects of broader social phenomena which are the most 
emotionally, psychologically and socially charged, and for which the scene of the 
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micro-encounter can function as a form of reinforcement. Of relevance here are 
features of race and colonialism, patriarchy, gender formation, ethnic conflict, 
criminality, white supremacy and (back to Benedict Anderson) nationhood. 
Admittedly, this seems to take us far beyond micro-encounters into the realms of 
social discourse, ‘ideology’ formation and cultural and geographic ‘imaginaries’. But 
such factors need to be slotted into the operations of micro-encounters precisely 
where Giddens talks of ontological support and patterns of trust, and Hochschild of 
social norms and feeling regulation. In Giddens’ work, it is not just that inner space is 
arranged as a set of rational devices for securing social routines; individual agency is 
itself inserted into a generally rational schematisation of how human interaction 
functions. The ‘mechanics of personality’ are embedded in a ‘day-to-day’ reality 
which he imagines proceeds ‘routinely and for the most part without fuss’ (1984, p. 
5). Critical interruptions of everyday routines, it seems, are incidental, and necessitate 
adaptations internal to the agents concerned. Likewise, for Hochschild, when things 
slip up through ‘the consequences of too much “illusion”’, the assumption is that this 
will be in affairs of the heart: ‘a love is killed, a suitor rejected, another hospital bed 
filled’ (p. 48). Neither model fully acknowledges the extent to which the public stage  
– available to the sociological imagination as a cognised scene – might itself be riven 
by conflicts, mistrust, disavowals, idealisations and other crises of representation, 
which make it impossible to establish ontological security, or social regulation, as 
something collectively and coherently produced. But without access to the security of 
that settled and cognised scene, what guarantees the shift (in Millsian terms) from the 
psychology of individual illusion to the sociological imagination of reality? 
Psychosocial dramaturgy, one might suggest, is antagonistic, messy and polyvocal, 
involving collusions and exclusions. It is as much about what is not cognised. 
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Such more catastrophic and critical concepts ofThis more critical version of the social 
field typically inaugurates work which that deploys strong concepts of fantasy, 
fiction, and the imaginary to construct arguments about social realities that are 
otherwise impossible to represent. Thus Walkerdine sought to expose the 
‘scientifically constituted’ arena of modern education in which ‘the fiction is 
perpetrated that equality can be produced’ (1990, p. 118), while at the same time 
denying the operation of power, sexuality, and the divisive constitution of gender. 
Slavoj Žižek (1997) describes fantasy as having a ‘radically intersubjective’ character 
which helps to conceal fundamental antagonisms at the heart of capitalism, 
obfuscating ‘the violence of its actual genealogy’ (p. 10). For Achille Mbembe, the 
discourse developed out of the colonial relationship between Europe and its other 
worlds was ‘fundamentally imaginary’, its modes of enquiry and curiosity 
‘inseparable from the work of fantasy’ that was also a form of violence (2017, pp. 12, 
17).  
 
I want to conclude by developing this point about the imaginary as the socially, rather 
than empirically, unrepresentable, by looking at two psychoanalytically-informed 
critiques of the kind of ontological mapping of psychosocial reality envisaged by 
Giddens. The first is from psychoanalyst and sociologist Steven Groarke’s Managed 
Lives (2014) which, up to a certain point, endorses Giddens’ project as having made 
‘a decisive contribution to the understanding of basic security in contemporary 
society, combining a traditional sociological emphasis on social order with a more 
existentially oriented account of personal experience’ (p. 151). Rooting his own 
analysis of ‘managed lives’ in Donald Winnicott’s work, Groarke locates this in the 
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context of new objects of concern emerging out of the Second World War, including 
the ‘absent mother’ and the ‘deprived child’. Against this background, ‘the link 
between security and social provision opens up new possibilities for the rationality of 
government’ (p. 26), with the mother identified as ‘the privileged anchorage point for 
administrative intervention’ (p. 27). At the same time, Groarke critiques Giddens, 
along lines already suggested, as being too cognitively biased, and too prone to use 
psychoanalysis selectively to underwrite a unitary construction of identity (p. 170). 
Giddens privileges ‘real-life events and conscious mechanisms of self-regulation over 
endopsychic entities or intrapsychic structures and functions’ (p. 152), coming to the 
conclusion that ‘the objective reality of social facts is consistent with the lived 
accomplishments of knowledgeable agents’ (p. 159). This, then, is one example of the 
logic through which emotion, fantasy and the imaginary are squeezed out of the 
picture. 
 
Groarke additionally takes Giddens’ ontology of security as trust, and elaborates its 
extra-cognitive dimensions more fully. ‘Giddens appears to accept the idea that trust 
is a condition of reliable cognition rather than a cognitive phenomenon as such.’ The 
implication is ‘not only that feeling comes before knowing, but also that a trusting 
orientation towards the world is distinguishable from the recognizable coherence of 
the world’ (p. 171). We are ‘inwardly secure as we hope to be’ (p. 172, my emphasis). 
Drawing on Winnicott’s account of childhood development, security is more than 
repetition, dependability, anticipation and, eventually, rational expectation – 
something Giddens himself came to concede (1991, p. 38). But Groarke gives body to 
this pre-reflexive grounding of truth and hope in a way that Giddens doesn’t, by 
involving Winnicott’s theorisation of spontaneity and illusion, facilitated by maternal 
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care.  Winnicott describes a situation ‘in which the mother makes experience 
available (or not) to the infant through a type of intuitive management that is in tune 
with the infant’s life. This suggests that it is a loving world, which the infant finds 
lovable’ (p. 15). Groarke is essentially revising Giddens’ model, founded on routines 
as a bulwark against anxiety, as something more ultimately sustained by loving care 
which, in the right form, allows (in Winnicottian terms) for the illusion necessary to 
gain access to reality. ‘Genuine contact with reality presupposes an ongoing 
imaginary subjective identification with the world’ (p. 12), one in which human life 
‘is understood as the impulse to dwell in its own nature, a pre-reflexive relation of 
immanence’ (p. 16). The essential difference here is that subjective identification with 
the world, in Groake’s terms, can’t wholly be assimilated to a neutrally cognised 
social scene. Security, rather, ‘is an expression of the vital normativity of the self’ 
(my emphasis, p. 172), where the ‘vital’ indicates the excluded creative and subjective 
dimensions of Giddens’ or Hochschild’s still somewhat more reflexive or cybernetic 
evocations of depth psychology. 
 
Here, however, comes the second critique – which is how does this model of ‘vital 
normativity’, of ‘dwellling’ which ‘grounds the life from which it emanates’ 
(Groarke, 2014, p. 16), fare when confronted with Fanon’s man of colour forced to 
‘run away from his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence’ (1952/86, p. 60) 
– not by insufficient maternal care, but by learning ‘the truth sometimes from smiles, 
sometimes from rumour or insult’ (p. 150). What happens to both the ‘ontology of 
understanding’ and that of ‘subjective illusion’ when faced with a subject structurally 
‘immiserated or affected by its own impossibility or nothingness’ (Marriott, 2018). 
Where, for Groarke, illusion is not symptomatic (as it is in Freud) but is in some ways 
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constitutive of subjectivity and of reality (as something ‘dwelled’ in), for Fanon 
something necessary for subjectivity becomes illusory when ‘I am being dissected 
under white eyes’ (Fanon, 1952/1986, p. 116). In the colonial drama – and even that 
of the post-colony – ‘everything is reduced to a permanent confrontation at the level 
of phantasy’ (Fanon, 1961/2004, p. 19). Or, as Frank Wilderson concludes, 
‘ontology’, ‘once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside – does not 
permit us to understand the being of the black.’ (2010, p 57). 
 
The implication is that there are extraneous dimensions of the imaginary which 
intervene in the drama of subjective presence and absence that Groarke tied to 
qualities of maternal care. There are cultural and historical legacies which, when 
encountered in maturity, can retrospectively (atemporally, even) rob infancy of its 
ontological support. To develop this point, I want to draw on two images from David 
Marriott’s Haunted Life which articulate something about the complex social 
functions of the imaginary, as something that can materialise empirically, yet also 
remain displaced from frameworks of social recognition and subjective dwelling 
alike. 
 
The first concerns a description of CCTV footage tracking a boy through the civic 
spaces of Southeast London who appears, to Marriott, to be ‘at play in himself’, 
repossessing the public space ‘until it becomes the space of the imaginary’ (p. xi). The 
footage is that of Damilola Taylor who fifteen minutes later, on 27 November 2000, 
would be found dying of a stab wound to his leg. But Marriott is concerned here less 
with the fact of his death – both missing and inexorably ‘present’ in the broadcast 
footage – and more with the way that on the tape ‘his death has no aura’: ‘like a pure 
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abstraction of the public sphere or an event without history, the CCTV image 
designates an excess of mimesis over that of narrative meaning’ (p. xiii). Though 
Damilola, in his last hour, may have devised ‘his own imaginary’, as spectators we 
are exposed to ‘the depressing emptiness of a nullity without horizon, received but 
never perceived by the nonmeaningful reproducibility of CCTV’ (p. xv). So far, so 
proximate to Groarke’s presentation of the schism between subjective illusion and its 
absence, the possibility of a world underpinned by ‘vital normativity of the self’, and 
one that is deprived of ‘being’ and ‘dwelling’, merely reproducible. But what 
ultimately concerns Marriott – introducing Fanon into a proto-Benjaminian account of 
the technological gaze – is the raced nature of the alternatives, which displaces the 
pre-ontological grounding of the subject once more from psychoanalytical into 
sociological space, or at least some complex psychosocial juncture between the two. 
What cannot be represented in the CCTV footage is, firstly, the imaginative life 
animating its subject, but, secondly, ‘the discursive frameworks, political and 
commercial interests, that ensure that some social “targets” are rendered more visible 
by surveillance than others in the geopolitical space of urban cities. It is around that 
invisibility – of racial hegemony and capital – and the excessive visibility of the 
socially undesirable, that the political and commercial legitimacy of CCTV coheres’ 
(p. xiv). 
 
To return one more time to the dramaturgy of sociology, Marriott is arguing here for 
the ways in which scenes of representation, of any kind, are haunted by violent 
histories and social dynamics they never reveal. In this case, the colonial regimes 
which still inform the contemporary protocols of urban surveillance, the logic of what 
gets captured in the image in the first place, and why? The violence of that history, it 
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seems, is never finally socially witnessed and recognised, but is destined to repeat 
itself in some limbo of the imaginary: ‘the occult presence of racial slavery, nowhere 
but nevertheless everywhere’ (p. xxi). The footage runs continuously but ‘It is as if 
whites and blacks were watching different screens’ (p. xxi), perpetuating a history 
‘that no one remembers, but to whom everyone is subjected.’ (p. 5).  
 
Returning also to the dramaturgies of psychoanalysis, Marriott is also arguing for the 
unacknowledged ways in which such logics of representation, such stark divisions in 
psychosocial ontology, forcibly impose themselves on the mind, the soma, and on 
language. If, in the example of Damilola, the problem might be ascribed to the 
technologies of managed lives, in the following chapters of the book Marriott makes 
clear that what plays inside the mind, in the unconscious even, is the same footage of 
race, violently inserted where the subject should be: ‘how strange it is to see a thing 
like this, the unconscious revealed like a vast movie screen bearing the phantoms and 
fears of freedoms past’ (p. 1). In Whither Fanon (2018) he will elaborate further on 
the ‘violent occupation of the psyche’ (p. 53)  in relation to sociogeny and colonial 
psychiatry. In Haunted Life, Marriott echoes the motifs of his prefatory essay in a 
chapter on visual culture and phantasms in John Edgar Wideman’s 2003 memoir The 
Island: Martinique. Here Marriott calls upon the reader to imagine the cultural 
spectator, ‘as a kind of Photomat, haemorrhaging images – think of all those Spirit 
photographs in which the medium’s body pours forth white ectoplasmic images. Then 
think of the medium’s body as black: a body altered, disfigured by the white gunk 
oozing from mouth and eyes; the spew of spirit’ (2007, p. 13).  
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There are a number of points one can elicit from this image, rendered purposefully 
grotesque. Firstly, most simply, the reference to the Spirit photograph captures that 
problem with which I began: how to materialise the ‘imaginary’, how to render it 
visible for social science. It taps into all those attempts to render the ghostly and the 
haunted – and psychical – aspects of the social, while pointing out how visual media 
(from the description of waking dreams, to photographs and advertisements) give 
examples of how such imagined material can become historically concrete and 
circulate socially and internally. A second thing it captures is the ways in which 
fantasy galvanises emotive and passionate investments – as we move from the neutral, 
near-automatic presence of ‘spectator’ as ‘Photomat’, to the violent and visceral 
register of disgust: blood flow, disfigurement and gunk. But the function of the 
experiment turns on a crucial third element, which is a rupture, or crisis, in 
representation – in the representation of the subject, and subjectivity as a site of co-
ordinated representations. It is this element, and not just the flow of images through 
and around the subject’s head, which is the truly ‘occult’ component here, and which 
introduces the note of shock and the improbable. The whole thing is an essential 
corrective to Mills’ conjuration of the ‘quality of mind’ necessary to achieve the 
‘bigger picture’ with which this article opened. And here I think Dawson (1994) 
misses something important when he characterises ‘cultural imaginaries’ as ‘those 
vast networks of interlinking discursive themes, images, motifs and narrative forms 
that are publicly available within a culture at any one time, and articulate its psychic 
and social dimensions’ (p. 48), evoking the imaginary as a useful – ‘available’ – 
extension to more overt objects of social investigation. What this misses out is the 
force of exclusion, the radical fault-lines, which run through the subjective experience 
of individuals, and social groups, segregating and inverting their relations to what is 
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apparently the same world. It is this violent paradox that Fanon captured in his thesis 
‘black skin, white masks’, and which Marriott restates here in the image of black 
bodies, white ectoplasm of the imaginal world.  
 
Not to see the radical disymmetry of phenomena here, for different subjects, turns 
‘seeing’ itself into a form of obliteration; ‘our very freedom to see is experienced as 
just another form of blind domination or domination by blindness’, beneath which lies 
a ‘more fundamental dialectic between the gaze we imagine and the gaze we are 
dispossessed by’ (Marriott, 2018, p. 13) which is unwittingly ‘interiorized by white 
and black subjects’. Interiorized, one might add, as a social fact, as a fact of social 
interaction. But unwittingly so, because of the failure of social analysis to take 
sufficient account of the imaginary, to think its own unthought and excluded 
dimensions, of which race has been a point of focus here as one possible example. I 
am arguing here for the imaginary as a necessary third component in the dialogue 
between psychoanalysis and sociology, not quite reducible to either camp, within 
which elements that are historically, or psychologically, or socially displaced, can be 
encountered and potentially recognised. The imaginary, in this sense, is not a coherent 
and cognisable scene, but a dimension within which one can begin to access the 
multitude of ways in which coherence and cognizance, and trust, fails. And this is 
necessary before one can ground an account of the social scene, or social interaction, 
in the forms defined, for example, by Giddens and Hochschild, or indeed by 
Winnicott. What the imaginary is able to constellate is precisely the instability, the 
antagonism, and the denial operating at the points through which both the personal 
world and that of particular groups are sutured to the social scene. It is a field through 
which critical questions can either be opened up or glossed over (discounted as merely 
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imaginary). Critical psychosocial studies is possibly that arm of social research which 
takes fantasy for real, which includes it in the ‘big picture’, where it disturbs and 
dislocates some of the routine assumptions about rational and social relations. For 
Marriott as for Fanon, ‘The more we observe such real fantasy, the better we shall be 
able to understand how its symbolic representations come to be implanted as parts of 
the habits of a culture where racial paranoia and psychosis come to be counted as 
common sense’ (Marriott, 2018, pp. 51).  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article considers the ‘imaginary’ as an entity that is often excluded from the 
sociological imagination, and argues that the imagination of human encounters – 
including fantasies about this – are essential for understanding the dynamics of 
interaction processes. Despite the emergence, since the 1980s, of a literature aiming to 
constitute fantasy and the imaginary as an object of social study, the sociological 
portrait of human interaction has remained dominated by cognitive models, even 
where these draw on psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic evocations of internal processes 
as a theatre, or dramaturgy, are placed alongside dramaturgical models of mental life 
from sociology, in order to pin-point the differences in their characterisation of the 
function of imagination, and especially its emotional investments. I argue for a view 
of imagination and fantasy as crucial social facts. Drawing in particular on 
psychoanalytically-informed examples from Frantz Fanon, David Marriott and others, 
I also argue that the reason why the imaginary keeps being rendered invisible to 
sociology is not because it cannot be empirically objectified. Rather it is because the 
antagonisms and disavowals which surround many interaction processes, along with 
the strong emotions this provokes, fail to fit with sociology’s assumptions about 
rational intent. 
 
 
                                                 
i See Derek Hook’s contention that ‘discourse analytic approaches… are not adequate to the task of 
apprehending racism in its ostensibly “extra-discursive” bodily and libidinal dimensions’ (2012, pp. 
46-47). 
ii According to Nikolay Mintchev, Kleinians have been slower than Lacanians to engage in the 
complexities and historical transformations in ethnic forms of exclusion ‘because the categories they 
work with describe deep unconscious processes that seemingly operate independently of 
language/culture’ (2018, p 235). 
iii See Bowker (2017) for a contribution that is directed specifically to ‘fantasy’. 
iv Interestingly, he chose to illustrate this through the example of psychodrama: patients ‘act out parts 
with some effectiveness... Their own past is available to them in a form which allows them to stage a 
recapitulation of it’ (p. 72). 
v See also Groarke’s criticism (2014, p. 180) that for Giddens ‘practical consciousness is more properly 
a type of what Freud called the preconscious… rather than the unconcious.  
